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Abstract 
 
Whereas much literature exists on “choice overload,” little is known about effects of numbers 
of alternatives in donation decisions. How do these affect both the size and distribution of 
donations? We hypothesize that donations are affected by the reputation of recipients and 
increase  with  their  number,  albeit  at  a  decreasing  rate.  Allocations  to  recipients  reflect 
different concepts of fairness – “equity” and “equality.” Both may be employed but, since 
they differ in cognitive and emotional costs, numbers of recipients are important. Using a 
cognitive (emotional) argument, distributions become more uniform (skewed) as numbers 
increase. In a survey, respondents indicated how they would donate lottery winnings of 50 
Euros.  Results  indicated  that  more  was  donated  to  NGO’s  that  respondents  knew  better. 
Second, total donations increased with the number of recipients albeit at a decreasing rate.  
Third, distributions of donations became more skewed as numbers increased. We comment 
on theoretical and practical implications. 
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Recently,  there  has  been  considerable  interest  in  how  numbers  of  alternatives  affect 
satisfaction with choice (see, e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2004; Scheibehenne, 
Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010). The literature documents adverse effects of “too much choice” 
for decisions involving, for example, pens (Shah & Wolford, 2007), pension plans (Iyengar, 
Huberman,  & Jiang, 2004), gift  boxes  (Reutskaja &  Hogarth, 2009), and wines (Bertini, 
Wathieu, & Iyengar, 2010). A recent meta-analysis suggests that the magnitude of effects 
depends on preconditions, choice moderators and the contexts in which decisions are made 
(Scheibehenne et al., 2010).  
  Analogous  effects  might  also  occur  in  other  domains.  For  example,  in  charitable 
giving  donors  decide  how  much  to  give  and,  often,  how  to  allocate  donations  across 
competing  charities.  However,  note  that  this  differs  from  consumption  decisions  where 
people typically choose  only  one of several  alternatives.  The purpose  of this  paper is to 
explore the effects of numbers of alternatives in donation decisions.    
Several  recent  studies  have  focused  on  different  aspects  of  the  donation  process 
including determinants of donation decisions (Landry et al., 2006; Chang, 2005), the impact 
of presentation mode (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007), the effect of social interactions 
(Schweitzer & Mach, 2008), herding behavior among donors (Martin & Randal, 2008) and 
methodologies for measuring altruistic behavior (Bekkers, 2007). However, little attention 
has  been paid  to  the relation between the number of choices  (e.g.,  charities,  NGOs, and 
campaigns) and subsequent donation decisions.   
In  fact,  we  have  only  been  able  to  locate  one  pertinent  study.  Scheibehenne, 
Greifeneder and Todd (2009) conducted an experiment involving charities while studying 
possible  moderators  of  choice  overload.  Specifically,  participants  (mainly  students)  were 
endowed with 1 Euro and had to decide either to donate it all to one charity they could 
choose from a specified list or to keep the money for themselves. If anything, the findings   4 
suggest that more choices (represented by longer lists) increase the proportion of donors. In 
addition, people are more likely to give to charities that are better known. Note, however, that 
this study did not address the issue of allocating donations across alternative charities. 
 
Theoretical considerations 
In  conceptualizing  how  donors’  decisions  are  affected  by  numbers  of  alternatives  (i.e., 
potential  recipients),  we  consider  three  issues.  First  are  the  reputations  of  the  recipients. 
Second, we consider the impact of numbers of potential recipients. And third, we hypothesize 
that as  the number of  recipients  increases, the  distribution of donations across recipients 
changes (becoming more uniform or skewed depending on different assumptions). 
Our first point is that people give more to recipients known to have good reputations 
than to those that are less well known. We consider this statement uncontroversial. It can be 
backed up, for example, by the fact that many charities and NGOs do much to increase 
awareness of their activities and “brand names” as well as experimental evidence (see, e.g., 
Scheibehenne at al., 2009). It leads to our first hypothesis: 
  H1. The sizes of donations made to specific recipients increase with their reputations.   
  Second,  three  issues  are  important  in  considering  effects  of  numbers  of  potential 
recipients. First, donations are limited in that donors face budget constraints. Second, we 
hypothesize  that  donors  obtain  more  personal  satisfaction  the  larger  their  donations. 
However, this satisfaction increases at a decreasing rate. Third, we assume that decisions to 
make  donations  are  sensitive  to  perceived  needs  of  recipients.  Thus,  factors  that  signal 
perceived need are important. One such factor is the number of potential recipients. Our 
rationale is simple. If a single NGO is seeking funds for a specific cause, that cause might be 
seen as important and worthy of support. However, if several NGOs are seeking funds for the   5 
same (or similar) cause, the need will be perceived as even greater. These three issues can be 
summarized by our second hypothesis: 
  H2.  Donations increase with the number of potential recipients but at a decreasing 
rate. 
Our third point focuses on how donations are distributed across potential recipients. 
We assume that donors seek to be “fair” in these decisions but, in doing so, implicitly deal 
with two different concepts of fairness.  In one, allocations reflect the relative inputs or merits 
of recipients. This is known as the “equity” rule and, in the present case, knowledge of NGOs 
can  be  taken  as  a  measure  of  merit.  Second,  although  equity  is  sometimes  assumed  to 
dominate judgments of fairness, people are also sensitive to considerations of “equality.” 
That is, a rule whereby all recipients receive equal allocations (Sarbagh, Dar, & Resh, 1994).  
Independent of the number of recipients, equity would always imply skewed, and 
equality  uniform  distributions.  However,  we  maintain  that  for  the  decision  maker, 
implementing  the  rules  involves  different  cognitive  and  emotional  costs  and  these  can 
interact with the number of potential recipients. Donors may thus not always follow the same 
rules in their allocations.   
  With few recipients, donors can probably discriminate between recipients and employ 
the  equity  rule.  However,  relative  to  the  equality  rule,  equity  is  costly  to  implement  in 
cognitive terms  and becomes even more taxing as  the numbers  of recipients increase. A 
cognitive cost argument would therefore imply switching from the equity to equality rule as 
the numbers of potential recipients increase thereby resulting in more uniform allocations.  
 From an emotional perspective, we assume that donors want to satisfy recipients. 
Thus, using the equity rule and explicitly denying/disappointing some is both emotionally 
hard and salient when there are few potential recipients. However, when there are many 
potential recipients,  it is emotionally  easier to  ignore the less “deserving” and apply the   6 
equity rule. From this perspective, therefore, allocations should become more skewed as the 
numbers of recipients increase.   
The cognitive and emotional cost arguments lead to alternative hypotheses: 
  H3a. The distribution of donations becomes more uniform across potential recipients 
as their numbers increase (the cognitive argument). 
  H3b. The distribution of donations becomes more skewed across potential recipients 
as their numbers increase (the emotional argument). 
  We next present an experiment that tests our three hypotheses. 
 
Experiment   
Participants, design, and procedure  
Participants were members of the general public in Spain using an online environment. Fifty-
four  percent  of  the  145  respondents  were  female  with  a  mean  age  of  34.9  (median  34, 
minimum 15, and maximum 69). Most participants had at least a university degree.  
At  the  beginning  of  a  40-minute  market  survey  on  an  unrelated  topic,  they  were 
informed that, in addition to the fixed remuneration for their participation, they had been 
entered in a lottery and had the chance of winning 50€ (expressed as 500 points) at the end of 
the experiment. They were further notified that, if they wished, they could “donate” as much 
as they wanted of their lottery winnings (from 0 to 500 points) to certain specified NGOs, 
split between recipients in any way they desired. The online setup guaranteed anonymity of 
responses. After making their choices, one person was to be chosen at random and given the 
extra 50€, less the amount of her/his donations. Thus, if the winner of the lottery gave away 
0, s/he would get to keep 50€; if s/he gave away, say, 30€, s/he would get to keep 20€. The 
money donated would go to precisely those NGOs specified by the winner.       7 
The names of the NGOs were provided along with the information that their common 
agenda is to aid underprivileged children. The respondents were allocated at random to three 
groups where they faced an alphabetical list of:  
-  3 NGOs    (Condition A with 54 respondents) 
-  8 NGOs    (Condition B with 43 respondents) 
-  16 NGOs  (Condition C with 48 respondents)  
The specific NGOs were selected after searching in the internet and popular media for 
international  organizations  with  a charity  agenda involving underprivileged children.  The 
names of NGOs presented in these three conditions are shown in Table 1.  
After making their decisions, respondents rated all 16 NGOs by indicating how much 
they knew about each prior to the experiment as follows: “0” implied that they had not heard 
of it, “1” that they had heard of it, “2” that they knew it, and “3” that the NGO is “very 
famous.” Only 6 respondents claimed to have heard of all 16 NGOs.  Moreover, 4 of the 16 
NGOs received average ratings of 1 or above on what we call the “knowledge score.” These 
data suggest that 16 NGOs represented a large choice set.    
(Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here) 
Results    
Table 2 presents the results of the experiment. The different NGOs are listed in the order of 
their mean popularity scores that are indicated in the column on the right. The knowledge 
scores make sense within the Spanish context of the study. Unicef has a sponsorship deal 
with the Barcelona football club that is very popular in the region where the study took place. 
Mercy Corps, on the other hand, is not well known within Spain. The intermediate columns 
of Table 2 show the mean donations in points in the three experimental conditions – A with 3 
NGOs, B with 8 NGOs, and C with 16 NGOs.   8 
Results  in  Table  2  support  Hypothesis  1.  Mean  knowledge  scores  of  the  NGOs 
correlate  (in  an  ordinal  sense)  with  mean  donations  (the  better  known  NGOs  receiving 
substantially larger contributions). Spearman’s rho is 1.00 (p<.01) for A; 0.64 (p=.09) for B; 
and 0.47 (p=.06) for C.  
Our  second  hypothesis  (H2)  is  that,  overall,  donations  should  increase  with  the 
number of recipients but at decreasing rate.  This is the case. The mean donation in condition 
B (8 NGOs) is greater than in condition A (3 NGOs) (314.21 vs. 236.20, t = 1.91, p = .059, 
Cohen’s d=.52); and the mean for condition C (16 NGOs) at 326.35 is also greater than 
condition A (t = 2.23, p = .028, Cohen’s d=.54).  The mean for condition C (16 NGOs) is 
greater  than  for  condition  B  (8  NGOs)  but  the  difference  is  not  statistically  significant 
(326.36 vs. 314.21, t = 0.283, p = .78, Cohen’s d=.42).   
Further evidence that donations increase with the number of potential recipients can 
be seen at the foot of Table 2 where we provide data characterizing individual contributions. 
As the number of potential recipients rises, so does the proportion of participants who donate 
their total endowment of 500 points – from 24.1% (3 NGOs) to 37.2% (8 NGOs) to 50.0% 
(16  NGOs).    (The  difference  between  16  and  3  NGOs  is  significant,  t  =  2.8,  p  <  .01).  
Moreover, note that whereas 29.6% of participants donate nothing when there are only three 
NGOs, this figure drops to 18.6% and 18.7% for the cases with 8 and 16 alternatives.    
Hypotheses 3a and 3b make contrary predictions – more uniform distributions as the 
number of recipients increase as opposed to more skewed distributions.  The data support the 
latter hypothesis. In condition A with three NGOs, all receive substantial donations albeit 
varying with their knowledge scores. In condition B with 8 NGOs, four (or 50%) receive 
76% of the contributions, and in condition C with 16 NGOs, four (or 25%) receive 92% of 
the  contributions.  Figure  1  shows  the  evolution  of  cumulative  donation  proportions  by   9 
numbers of potential recipients. (Skewness coefficients for donations in conditions A, B and 
C are -.81, 2.01, and 2.42 respectively).  
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
These overall trends are also supported by the individual data summarized at the foot 
of Table 2. Whereas 24.1% of participants adopt the strategy of giving the same non-zero 




Our first result – that donations are affected by knowledge of recipients – is neither surprising 
nor controversial. However, it interacts strongly with the number of potential recipients and, 
in particular, the fact that the distribution of donations becomes more skewed as the number 
of recipients increases.   
Consider  the  donations  made  to  the  three  NGOs  in  condition  A,  namely  Unicef, 
Oxfam,  and  Mercy  Corps.  In  condition  A,  two  well-known  NGOs,  Unicef  and  Oxfam, 
receive large mean donations (100.28 and 83.26), and even the little known Mercy Corps 
receives  52.37.  As the  numbers  of  recipients  increase, Unicef  – the best  known NGO  – 
maintains  its  share  of  total  donations  (some  40%)  and  so  benefits  in  absolute  terms  as   
overall donations grow. On the other hand, both Oxfam and Mercy Corps see reductions. In 
the case of Mercy Corps, the drop-off is dramatic: from 52:37 (A) to 15.67 (B) to 0.42 (C).  
  Our second hypothesis assumes that people are sensitive to cues that signal need and 
adjust the level of their donations accordingly. Moreover, the number of potential recipients 
is one such cue. In fact, our data show that donations increase with the number of potential 
recipients albeit at a decreasing rate. Moreover, this is in accordance with our hypothesis that 
the satisfaction donors obtain from giving increases with the size of their donations, also at a   10 
decreasing rate. Of course, donors are subject to budget constraints and thus, as the number 
of potential recipients increase, cannot increase donations beyond a certain point.   
  Our third hypothesis contrasted two views on the fairness of allocating amounts to 
different recipients. It was argued that allocations based on rules of equity and equality are 
affected by the cognitive and emotional costs to the decision maker of following the rules.  
Specifically, following a cognitive (emotional) argument the distribution of donations should 
become  more  uniform  (skewed)  across  recipients  as  the  numbers  of  potential  recipients 
increases.   
In  fact,  we  found  increasing  skewness  of  donation  allocations  as  the  numbers  of 
potential recipients increased. For example, it was significant that whereas about one quarter 
of participants explicitly followed the equality principle for conditions A and B (3 and 8 
NGOs), none used it when confronted by 16 options. However, although our results support 
an emotional as opposed to cognitive argument for explaining the pattern of data observed, 
this does not of course exclude all cognitive considerations. For example, cognitive factors 
could have played a role in ignoring some alternatives when there were many. 
  The innovative contribution of the present work is to consider how the number of 
potential recipients  affects donation decisions in terms of both  amounts and distributions 
across alternatives. That there are such effects is important from both theoretical and practical 
viewpoints.  From  a  theoretical  viewpoint,  we  have  opened  the  door  to  illuminating  how 
cognitive and emotional considerations might interact in donation decisions.   At a practical 
level, our results emphasize the importance of the reputation of NGOs and the size of the 
markets  in  which  they  compete  for  funds.  If  market  size  is  captured  by  the  number  of 
potential recipients, then it pays for leading NGOs to seek large “markets.” Lesser known 
NGOs, however, should avoid competition.   
     11 
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Every Child 
Global Fund for Children 
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Save the Children 
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Condition  A  B  C     
N  54  43  48     
No. of NGOs  3  8  16     





(181.1)    2.59 
Médicins sans Frontières  x  x  78.85 
(156.9)    2.30 





(102.0)    2.01 
Save the Children  x  x  28.54 
(53.4)    1.32 
Global Fund for Children  x  26.14 
(46.0) 
0.42 
(2.0)    0.44 





(2.0)    0.39 
Plan International   x  x  0.42 
(2.0)    0.39 
United Children's Fund  x  18.09 
(27.5) 
2.29 
(14.5)    0.37 
SOS Kinderdorf International  x  x  8.96 
(39.0)    0.24 
Children's Network International  x  16.74 
(27.2) 
1.46 
(7.4)    0.21 
Serving Our World  x  x  2.92 
(14.7)    0.21 
Stop Child Poverty  x  25.07 
(50.9) 
2.50 
(14.5)    0.20 
EveryChild  x  18.02 
(27.6) 
1.46 
(7.4)    0.19 
Care  x  x  0.42 
(2.0)    0.17 
World Emergency Relief  x  x  2.71 
(14.7)    0.17 
Children in Crisis  x  x  1.46 
(7.4)    0.16 
           





(208.7)     
           
Proportions           
   A   B    C 
% of participants giving equal non-zero amounts  24.1  23.3  0.0 
% of participants giving away 0 points  29.6  18.6  18.7 
% of participants giving away all 500 points  24.1  37.2  50.0 
   16 
Figure 1: Cumulative distributions of donations for different number of potential recipients 
 
 
 